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SOME TRENDS OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND
NATURAL LAW STUDY IN JAPAN
It is a remarkable event in postwar Japan that jurists have taken a con-
siderable interest in the problems of legal philosophy. Studying these problems,
some jurists- only a few, but some of the more influential professors of the
law schools - have turned to -the principles of natural law. It is my purpose
to survey this situation in Japan. Before describing it, I shall sketch the earlier
systems of Japanese moral and legal thought.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In her history Japan has received various systems of thought of foreign
origin, and each is still alive as a spiritual energy in her social life. These
foreign systems were added to a primary layer of traditional thought - a
naturalistic and secular sentimentalism. This layer formed in the Japanese
subconscious an ultranationalistic tribal patriotism. The first foreign influence
was Buddhism, which became the national religion soon after its appearance
in Japan and enjoyed political protection until Japan adopted a policy of
freedom of religion about a century ago. With the coming of freedom of
religion, Buddhism's deterministic tenets lost their moral influence, though
Buddhism still appears to be alive in customs of everyday life. Confucianism,
the second foreign current, was officially adopted as the national morality after
the decline of Buddhism, and, with the establishment of the feudal regime, it
became an authoritative morality, particularly for the ruling and the intellectual
classes. The naturalistic character of its ethics, like that of Stoicism, was
adaptable to the traditional sentimentalism of the Japanese. But its ethical
norms, in Japan as in China, where it originated, were best suited to a feudal
age. The last foreign influence was Christian morality, which was brought into
Japan about four centuries ago when she began to open the door to European
nations and, through the Christian missionaries, to their civilization. But until
freedom of belief and of thought was recognized by the Meiji Reform, Chris-
tian morality could not have a large influence upon the people; and Christians
suffered hard persecution by the Tokugawa regime. Even under such condi-
tions, however, a few scholars, who were informed of European culture
through Dutch or Portuguese traders and missionaries, wrote books concerning
ethics from the viewpoint of natural law.1
When Japan changed her diplomacy to open the door to the Christian
countries after the Meiji Reform, a new situation was brought about; in order
to take part in the modem civilized world, Japan began to develop modem
1. Among a very few writers who at that time adopted in part the Christian natural law
idea, Ando Shoeki (1701-?) has been made well known by the workof E. HERBERT NORMAN,
ANDO SHOEKI AND TiE ANATOMY OF JAPANESE FEUDALISM (1949). For the first attempt
to treat his natural law thought see Yoshinori Inagaki, Ando Shoeki and Natural Law
Thought, 17 ACADEMIA (1957) [Journal of Catholic University of Nagoya (Nanzan)].
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legal institutions such as constitutional law, liberating herself from the ideological
and religious restraints of the ancient regime. As the result of these reforms
many ideas were brought into Japan from America and Europe. In the making
of the Constitution, those who desired to build up the democratic regime opposed
the conservatives by standing on the notion of natural rights which had de-
veloped in Europe in the time of the Enlightenment. 2 At the same time, par-
ticularly in formulating the civil code, there arose a bitter controversy between
proponents of English law and proponents of French law. This controversy
ended with the defeat of the latter and, therewith, the natural rights ideas of
French origin. 3 Soon after that, proponents of German law began to flourish,
and, finally, German public law was almost wholly received by Japan because
it seemed most adaptable to the Meiji Regime's desire to establish a constitu-
tional monarchy like that of the German Empire.4
After the final victory of German law, most of the jurists who were engaged
in studying and teaching at the law schools followed the theories of the so-called
2. In Japan the dispute over the making of the Constitution was not as to whether it should
be done or not, but as to whether it should be done sooner or later. The Meiji Government
from the beginning had the opinion that a constitution should be drafted after due prepara-
tion; for this purpose it sent, in 1882, Hirobumi Ito to Europe, where he studied the Ger-
man (Prussian) Constitution under the guidance of Professor Stein. In opposition to this,
many writers and statesmen who were versed in European revolutionary thought insisted
on establishing the national assembly at once in order to discuss the drafting of the Con-
stitution. Among them, Taisuke Itagaki, Taneomi Soejima, and Shimpei Eto were states-
men who lost political power as the result of their unsuccessful coup d'stat. The following
participated in the drafting dispute, claiming that the people's constitution should be
drafted by the people's parliament: earlier, Shinichiro Tsuda, author of TAIszi KoKUHO-
RON [Constitutions of Western Countries] (1868), and Hiroyuki Kato, author of RiKKEN
SErTAi RyAKU [Outlines of Constitutional Government] (1868) and SHINSz TAU [On
True Government] (1870); and later, Edamori Ueki, the theoretical leader of the so-
called "Jiyu-minken-undo Movement" [Movement of People's Government], and Kentaro
Oi and Tatsui Baba, two very radical republicans.
3. As early as 1872, Shimpei Eto, a minister of the Judicial Department at that time,
intended to codify a Japanese Civil Code by receiving the Code Civile as a whole, and
translated it with the cooperation of Mizukuri Shinsaku. The next year, the Meiji Govern-
ment invited G. E. Boissonade from France to be an adviser on legislation. Under his
leadership a draft of a Civil Code (which we now call the old civil code) was completed
in 1890. At that time Tokyo Law School, founded in '1871 (now Tokyo University), and
Tokyo Hoogakuin, founded in 1885 (now Chuoo University), taught mainly English
law; and those jurists who had been taught, and were familiar with, English law
strongly opposed enactment of the Civil Code draft by issuing a statement in 1889 that
the draft was thoroughly biased toward French law, without consideration of the other
systems of law in civilized nations. The leaders of this opposition were Masaaki Tomii
and Chyu Egi. As a result of it, enactment of the draft in 1893 was postponed, and a
new draft, based upon the first draft of B. G. B. (German Civil Code), was hastily
made in 1897 under the leadership of Nobushige Hozumi, Kenjiro Ume, and Masaaki
Tomii. A Commercial Code draft, also shaped by Boissonade, suffered from the same
opposition as did the Civil Code draft, and finally the Commercial Code also was received
from German law.
4. See on the Constitution: MASATSUOU INADA, MExjx KENPO SEnuTsU-SHi [History of
the Formation of the Meiji Constitution] (1960-1961). See on the Civil Code: TORU
HoSHINO, MINPOTEN RONSO [On the Controversy over Codification of the Civil Code]
(1949); TORu HosHINo, NIPPON NO HOGAKU [History and Future of Jurisprudence in
Japan] (I. Suehiro ed. 1950). See on the Criminal Code: KcmsiasuARo NAKAMURA,
KEIHO [Criminal Law] (1960).
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Begriffsjurisprudenz, which was the prevalent tendency among German jurists
at that time. Most of them viewed legal philosophy as Allgemeine Jurisprudenz,
similar to the Analytical Jurisprudence of Austin. Nobushige Hozumi, who
founded the Chair of Legal Philosophy at the Law School of Tokyo University,
explicitly declared that his legal philosophy should be properly called general
-or analytical- jurisprudence. 5 In spite of this tendency, natural law theories
were cultivated by a few specialists in French law. Meanwhile, Social Darwin-
ism gradually gained favor among the jurists, who were influenced by the social
theories of Spencer and S. H. Maine.6 It was natural that those jurists who
took such a positivistic view as that of analytical jurisprudence should adopt
Darwinism in their social philosophy.
Through the first decade of the twentieth century most jurists were entirely
indifferent to legal philosophy; it was their professional task, they believed, to
engage solely in interpreting and collecting the rules of the given positive laws
or of the cases decided in court. Beginning in 1920, however, new trends
of Freirechtsbewegung or of Rechtssoziologie were imported from Germany,
and the newly developed legal philosophy of Neo-Kantianism brought about a
limited renaissance of legal philosophy in Japan.T The theories of Lask, Stamm-
ler and Radbruch were most studied. Stammler's theory of "natural law with
variable content" had not so great an influence as that of Ratbruch's relativism
and Kelsen's pure theory of law. The natural law theories of the French
jurists, such as Charmont, Geny, and Sareille, were also given some attention.
At the same time the sociological positivists began to develop under the influ-
ence of Jhering, Ehrlich, and Marx.8
In this confused situation, where various trends of legal thought coexisted,
Dr. Kotaro Tanaka, a former professor of commercial law at Tokyo University,
began his academic work based on the natural law idea, and attempted to criti-
cize Neo-Kantianism and sociologism. Since that time, he has continually de-
voted himself to making the natural law idea a solid ground for not only the
5. NonusmoE Hozum, Hoso YAWA [Everynight Speeches on Legal Topics] (1916).
6. Darwinism was introduced in Japan early (about 1877) by natural law scientists and
philosophers who had studied in Europe and America. But the most influential Social
Darwinist was a jurist, Hiroyuki Kato, who wrote JINKEN SHINRON [A New Theory of
Human Rights] (1882), in which Tenno's supreme political power was defended by
applying a doctrine of "survival of the fittest." See his more systematic writing on Social
Darwinism, DOTOKu Horrsu SHINKA NO Ri [On Evolution of Morals and Law] (1894).
Later, Hozumi, who was also a founder in Japan of comparative and historical study of
law under the influence of Maine and Spencer, wrote HoRsTsu SHINKA-RON [Theory of
Evolution in Law] (1924-1926).
7. Jurists who followed the new German philosophy were Seiichiro Ono, author of
HORIOAKU TO BUNKA NO GAINEN [Meaning of Jurisprudence and Culture] (1928); Kyo
Tsuneto, author of HIHAN-TEKI HORrrSU-TETSUOAKU NO KENKY [Study of Kritische
Rechtsphilosophie] (1924); Kaku Kuroda, author of WIEN GAKUHA NO HoRITSUOAKU
TO SONO SHO-asONDA [Jurisprudence of the Wiener School and Its Problems] (1927).
8. The founder and leader of sociological positivism in legal study in Japan was Itsutaro
Suehiro. He was the first man of Freirechtsbewegung in Japan and challenged the then
prevalent conservative Begriffsjurisprudentst tendency. Eiichi Makino, a former professor of
criminal law at Tokyo University, learned his sociological view of the law from French
sociologists and jurists.
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legal, but also the moral and cultural, life of Japan. 9
After about 1930, however, when Japan came under the absolute despotism
of the Tenno Regime, it became taboo for jurists and publicists to criticize
legislation or state policy. As this taboo meant nothing but the surrender of any
philosophical treatment of law or state, it led naturally to the degeneration of
legal philosophy in general, except that of Hegel and of Kelsen. In Germany,
Hegel's theory of state and law, it may be, contributed to the Nazis' ideology,
but in Japan an irrational myth of the nation did not need any kind of state-
philosophy. Hegel was thus not needed, but Kelsenism had, in a negative way,
its raison d'etre for the Japanese intellectual. Although Kelsen's theory lacked
content, its subtle logical methodology could supply the external forms of a
scientific system. It was utilized either as a shelter from ideological control or
as a disguise for scientific construction.10
Even under such strict ideological control, Tanaka made an effort to apply
and develop natural law ideas not only in the area of commercial law, but in
that of legal philosophy. In 1934 he successfully completed his great work,
World Law, which was highly thought of by all jurists, even his opponents. 1
This was an epoch-making work, a history of natural law which went far beyond
the mere importing or digesting of theories which had originated in foreign
countries.
II. NATURAL LAW STUDIES AFTER WORLD WAR II
It will be understood from the above historical survey that, although Japan
succeeded in modernizing herself by receiving the Western social, political,
and legal apparatus after the Meiji Reform, she could not give it life. Similarly,
in the domain of legal thought no true treating of legal philosophy had been
tried, and the position of legal philosophy at the law schools had not been estab-
lished before the War. It is no wonder that the ideas of natural law could not
inspire and attract the jurists here.
After World War II, however, Japan adopted the new Constitution and
radically and broadly amended her civil and other codes to accord with it. The
internal, as well as external, change had such a great influence upon the Japanese
people that they could accept a new way of thinking and adopt a mental attitude
common to all the world. Until the end of the War they could not give much
weight to ideas beyond the ideological absolutism in which they had found their
moral and legal standard. But the experience of the defeat in war with its terrible
losses broke their belief in absolutism and imposed upon them the task of finding
a new moral standard based upon something else than the state or the nation.
As in many countries, so in Japan, Marxist ideology sifted as a draught into
the vacuum of thought immediately after the War, and some part of the intellec-
9. See KOTARO TANAKA, HORITSU-TETSUGAKU RONSHU [Essays on the Philosophy of
Law] (vol. 1, 1942, vol. 2, 1945); TANAKA, HO TO SHUUKYO TO SHAKAI-SEIKATSU
[Law, Religion and Social Life] (1927); TANAKA, KYOYO TO BUNKA NO Kiso [The Basis
of Culture and Civilization] (1937).
10. E.g., KiSABURO YOKOTA, KOKUSAX-HO NO HO-TEKi SEISHITSU [Legal Nature of
International Law] (1944).
11. TANAKA, SEKAI-1O NO RmON [Theory of World Law], 3 vols. (1932-1934).
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tual class ran radically to the extreme of criticizing and negating not only the past
but also the present social and legal order of the state. Marxist political power
also increased in Japan by taking advantage of the economic difficulties of the
time. Yet at the same time, emancipated from the ideological domination of the
myth of state or nation, the people began to find their morality in the common
beliefs of all men. The newly established Constitution, founded on such beliefs,
became an important factor in developing the ideas of natural law among them.
Most of the jurists, confronted with the Constitution to which the civil law
had to be conformed, began to consider positive law not only from the view of
mere juridical logic hitherto deemed orthodox, but also from the viewpoint of
legal philosophy. This approach led naturally to the remarkable phenomenon of
virtually all jurists feeling that they should have an interest in the study of legal
philosophy. Under such auspicious circumstances, the Japan Legal Philosophy
Association was founded in 1948. Immediately after its inauguration the Asso-
ciation made preparations for publishing its Quarterly Review. Its first volume
was published under the subtitle Natural Law and Positive Law, a title which re-
flected the common concern of all jurists at that .time.X2 Though before the War
there had been only a few professors of legal philosophy, after the War its study
attracted many young postgraduate students, who studied under leading pro-
fessors such as Tanaka, Tsuneto, and Otaka. Those students are now teaching
as professors at the several law schools where legal philosophy was added after the
War as a necessary subject in the newly established system of legal instruction.13
As the new Constitution was adopted on the pattern of European and Amer-
ican democracy, which was ideologically based upon the idea of natural rights
elaborately developed in the Enlightenment, most of the jurists and legal phi-
losophers have had no concern except to study the idea of natural rights in Locke,
Pufendorf, Rousseau and others. In 1951 there appeared an excellent work by
Dr. Kojiro Wada, a professor at Waseda University, containing almost all the
theories of natural law writers from Grotius to Rousseau, 14 and this first attempt
in Japan to read and trace their theories in the original texts was much valued.
In explaining and criticizing these natural law theories, Wada adopted the view
that they show the progress of the independence of man being emancipated from
treatment as ancilla Dei. Such a view of natural law is generally accepted in
Japan by almost all political and legal philosophers. For example, Kyo
Tsuneto's article, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy in the Area of Public
Law," takes this view.15 Tomoo Otaka's article in the same Symposium also
12. 1 HoTETSUOAKU SHIKIHO [Quarterly Review of Legal Philosophy] (1947). This
volume contained four articles: K. Kimura, "Natural Law and Positive Law"; K. Tanaka,
"Legal Philosophy of Soloviefi"; K. Wada, "Law of Nature and Historical School of Law";
T. Otaka, "Metaphysics and Empiricism in Legal Philosophy." It also contained several book
reviews.
13. E.g., Jyunichi Aomi (Tokyo Univ.), Tsuneo Hirano (Nagoya Univ.), Kazuo Amano
(Ritsumeikan Univ., Kyoto), Mitsukuni Yazaki (Osaka Univ.), Sefichi Anan (Osaka City
Univ.), Akira Mizunami (Kyushu Univ.).
14. Kojmo WADA, KINDAI SHIZENHO-OAKU NO HATTEN [Development of Modern
Natural Law Science] (1951).
15. In MINSHU-SHU0o NO HO-OENRI [Legal Principles of Democracy], edited by Tomoo
Otaka. Also contained in this volume were: Otaka, Idea of Law in Democracy; Wagat-
suma, On Civil Law Principles; Yokota, On International Law Principles.
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seems to follow such a humanistic or secularized notion of natural law, while he
seeks to found democracy upon the relativism of Radbruch's legal philosophy.1 6
As to modern natural law theories, there have appeared innumerable articles
since the end of the War. Among them, the articles concerning modem natural
law theories (of England by Professor Inoue, of Germany by Professor Yazaki,
and of France 'by Professor T. Tsuneto) in the third volume of Lectures on Legal
Philosophy should be taken as the best summaries on this theme.17 In 1953,
Yazaki published a book in which the natural law theories of Pufendorf and
Wolff were traced and examined with respect to the formation of modem civil
society. ls At about the same time, Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie and Naturrecht
were translated into the Japanese language by Hirano.19
In spite of the greater interest in natural law ideas of the modem period than
in those of the Middle Ages, a small group of Catholics interested in the natural
law idea had developed under the guidance of Kotaro Tanaka before the War.
Under his guidance and influence, not a few jurists came to have an understand-
ing of the Catholic natural law idea, and, it is important to note, they came to
realize how it differs from the extremely rationalistic modem conceptions. As
early as 1930, Tanaka wrote about the natural law theory of St. Thomas in his
well-known article, "The Past History of Natural Law and its Contemporary
Significance," in which he explained how the openness of St. Thomas's natural
law theory could give it vitality today even when under bitter attack from
positivism.2 0 But such revaluation of Thomas's natural law has not been so
much accepted by the jurists as his philosophy in general has been accepted by
the philosophers. 2 '
It has been more interesting for modem jurists to study St. Thomas's legal
philosophy through contemporary neo-Thomistic theories of the natural law or
of the state than to understand it in the original Latin text. Those who have
studied French law have long used such an approach. Even before World War
II, the legal theories of Renard, Hauriou, and Geny were known here, and Mari-
16. Otaka, supra note 15.
17. LECTURES ON LEGAL PHILOSOPHY [Hotetsugaku Koza] 8 vols., edited by Otaka,
Minemura, and Kato. Since publication of the first volume in 1956, seven additional
volumes have been issued, despite a delay caused by the sudden death of Dr. Otaka in
1956. The LECTURES are edited under the following plan: VoL I is devoted to FUNDA-
MENTAL THEORY OF LAw; vols. 2-5 to HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT op LEGAL THOUGHT;
vols. 6-8 to LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN THE AREA OF POSITIVE LAW.
18. MrTsuKUNI YAZAKI, SHIZENHO [Natural Law] (1953).
19. HEGEL, SHIZENHO-RON [fber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Natur-
rechts] (Hirano transl., 1948).
20. Tanaka, Shizenho no Kako oyobi sono Gendai-teki Igi, reprinted in TANAKA,
2 ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1944).
21. From year to year, the number of philosophers who study and accept Thomistic
philosophy has increased, and some volumes of Aquinas's work have been translated into
the Japanese language: K. KOKUBU, NINOEN-RON [Treatise on Man] (transl. of I SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, qq. 75-89) (1949); V. M. POULIOT and A. KUSAXA, Yu To HONSHITSU NI
TSUITE (transl. of De Ente et Essentia) (1955); an earlier translation of the same work
had been issued by S. Takakuwa in 1935; more recently, Y. INAGAKI, Ho NI TSUITE [On
Law] (trawl. of Do Legibus of II SUMMA THEOLOOIAE qq. 90-97) (1958). For a full
listing of Japanese study on St. Thomas and scholastic philosophy, see SCHOLASTIC BIBLr-
OGRAPHY IN JAPAN, ed. by Iriagaki (Catholic University of Nagoya, 1957).
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tan's legal and political philosophy became widely known among the jurists after
the War. Dr. Ryuzo Maitani was an early exponent of the "institution theory"
of Renard and Hauriou, and he did not merely introduce it, but developed from
it a unique juridical construction concerning commercial contracts. In his valu-
able book, Law of Standardized Terms (1954), he tried to reconstruct the old-
fashioned individualistic contract theory by applying "institution theory" to
phenomena in the area of commercial law which could not be handled merely
by the free contract principles of modem civil law.
Jacques Maritain's work in the area of philosophy had been known here
before the War by only a few Catholic philosophers. After the War, however,
several of his works on legal and political philosophy, upon being introduced
or translated, immediately attracted the eyes of all.2 2 The significance of his
natural law theory of the state and politics was well analyzed by Kotaro Tanaka
in his article, "Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain." 23 It is interesting to
consider why the legal and political philosophy of Maritain has drawn so much
attention from the jurists in postwar Japan. The fact that his works cover almost
all the fundamental prinaiples of the new Constitution of Japan is, I suppose,
the reason for this attentiveness, for all jurists in Japan today are trying to dis-
cover how to harmonize human rights and the common good - the two legs
upon which the new Constitution of Japan stands. Excepting those who stand
only on one or the other, it 'has seemed essential to most jurists in their judicial
work concerning the Constitution to integrate these principles.
Even before the War, natural law theories in America were known here
through such works as Haines' The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930),
and Wright's American Interpretations of Natural Law (1931), and since the
War, substantial attention has been paid to the remarkable growth of legal philoso-
phy in America. In prewar Japan teachers of legal philosophy in the law schools
said nothing about American legal philosophy except a few words on the prag-
matist legal theory of Roscoe Pound.24 After the War, Japan's legal philoso-
phers were much interested in sociological or experimental jurisprudence as well
as academic work in natural law jurisprudence. Two recent articles by Professor
Hayakawa, "Pragmatism and Neo-realism" and "Development of Legal Phi-
losophy in Postwar America," provide a good sketch of natural law tendencies in
22. MARITAIN, KINDA-SHISO NO SENKU-SHA [Trois Reormateurs] (trans. by S.
Iwashita, 1936); MARITAIN, KEIJIJYO-OAKU JYORON [Introduction Ginirala a la Philoso-
phie] (trans. by Y. Yoshimitsu, 1943); MARITAIN, SHUKYO To BUNKA [Religion and
Culture] (trans. by Yoshimitsu, 1944); MARITAIN, JINKEN TO SHIZENHO [Les Droits de
I'Homma et la Loi Naturalle] (trans. by I. Otsuka, 1948); MA.ITAIN, KOKyO-FUKUsn'-
RON [La Personne et le Bien Commun] (trans. by Otsuka, 1957).
23. Tanaka, Jacques Maritain no Seiji-tatsugaku, in TSUNETO HAKASE KANREKi KINEN-
RONSHU [Commemorative Collections on the Sixtieth Birthday of Dr. Kyo Tsuneto] (1949).
24. Most of Pound's works had been translated into Japanese before the War: Et-Bt-so
NO SMSHIN [The Spirit-of the Common Law] (1926); HORITSU-'rTSUoAKu NYuMON [An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law] (1926); Ho TO DOTOKU [Law and Morals] (1928);
HORITSU-SHIKAN [Interpretations of Legal History] (1931). After the War there appeared
Ho NO NINmu [The Task of Law] (1954) and SHAKAXOAKU-TEKi HOOAKU [a translation
of both New Paths of the Law and Justice According to Law] (1957).
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America, although Hayakawa himself is opposed to natural law, and praises the
positivism of experimental jurisprudence.2 5
German legal philosophy has drawn much attention in Japan, partly because
of Japanese jurists' traditional acquaintance with it and partly because of the
renaissance in postwar Germany of natural law both in Thomistic and in
existentialist expressions. In particular, many debates took place concerning the
conversion of Radbruch from "relativism" to "natural law." 26 In "Juridical
Positivism and Natural Law Theories in Postwar Germany," Yazaki pointed out
the causes of the so-called natural law revival in postwar Germany and concluded
that Radbruch could not be an exception to the general state of mind of postwar
German jurists who. had experienced revulsion from the Nazis' ruthless juridical
positivism. 27 Otaka also described Radbruch's conversion, in his article on
"Natural Law Ideas in Postwar Germany," 28 and his preface to the Japanese
translation of Radbruch's Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie is valuable and remark-
able in its important conclusion that no other idea or system of thought but
natural law could have been relied on by the German people as a check on the
absolutist rule of the Nazis. Both Mitteis's Naturrecht and Coing's Grundziige
der Rechtsphilosophie (1950) were reviewed here soon after their publication.29
Further, Fechner's Rechtsphilosophie drew the attention of legal philosophers.
Other works of German natural law writers, such as those of Wolf, Ritter, and
Welzel, are also briefly mentioned in "Contemporary Natural Law Theories" by
Professor Yoshiyuki Noda.S0
In the field of French jurisprudence, Dr. Naojiro Sugiyama, who has been
one of Japan's most influential professors of French law, recently published a
voluminous collection of his articles and essays, chiefly concerning comparative
jurisprudence. 3 1 Although he has not directly treated the theme of natural law,
he inspired both understanding and interest in it; not a few jurists, includ-
ing Tanaka, became natural law adherents under his influence. Yoshiyuki Noda,
a professor of French law, has written about French legal philosophers such as
25. HAYAKAwA, JIKKEN-HOOAKU NO SHUCHO NI TSUITE, 25 KIKAN HORITSU-OAKU 7
[The Quarterly Law Review] (1958); Pragmatism and Neo-realism, in 5 LECTURES ON
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1958).
26. These debates began about 1951, when Radbruch's book Vorschule der Rechts-
philosophie became known in Japan. It was reviewed by Wada, Radbruch no Hotetsugaku
Nyumon, 27 WASEDA HOOAKU 1 (1951). In the same year Yazaki also considered the
problem of Radbruch's conversion and to a certain extent doubted it. Radbruch Hotet-
sugaku ni okeru Bannen no Kadai [Radbruch's Task as a Legal Philosopher in his Later
Life], 23 HORITSU JiHo 53 (1951). In opposition to Yazaki, Otaka approved Rad-
bruch's conversion in his Preface to Anan's Japanese translation (1955) of Vorschule.
27. M. Yazaki, Sengo Doitsu ni okeru Ho-jisshoshugi to Shizenho-ron, 4 OSAKA UNIVER-
SITY LAw REVIEw 47 (1952).
28. Sengo Doitsu no Shizenho Shiso, 71 HOGAxU KYOKA! ZASSHI 1 [Law Review
of Tokyo Univ.] (1953).
29. N. KOBAYASHI, COINo NO HOTETSUOAKU [Coing's Grundzige der Rechtsphilosophie]
(1951); M. YAZAKI, MITrEIS's NO SHIZENHO-RON [Mitteis's Naturrecht] (1952).
30. 5 LECTURES ON LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, no. 2 (1959). This volume of the LECTURES
deals with the trend of contemporary legal thought in Europe, America, and the Soviet
Union.
31. SUOSYAMA, HOGEN To Ho-KAIsHAxU [Sources and Interpretation of Law] (1957).
As a professor at Tokyo University, Sugiyama was a pioneer of the study of French law in
Japan and a leading Japanese exponent of natural law theories.
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Geny and Sareille in History and Idea in Law.32 This book is still read by many
as the sole Japanese academic work concerning French legal philosophies. It
contains three valuable articles: "Prehistory of Contemporary Legal Thinking-
Historical Background of the Development of Jurisprudence among the Glossa-
tors," "An Objective Realization of Natural Law Theory in Sareille," and "An
Outline of the Natural Law Theory of Geny." Besides Maritain, the other
French natural law writers have been little known here except for Roubier,
Leclercq, and LeFur.
Jurists have had no less interest in more particular problems of legal
philosophy. As some important political or social events brought their at-
tention to particular themes, jurists have been seriously engaged in treating them.
To begin with, the maxim lex dura sed lex was adopted as the common theme
at the annual session of the Japan Legal Philosophy Association held in 1953.s3
At that time, somewhat reactionary attempts to amend the Constitution and the
other laws were made -by the Government under the pretense of reforming them
in order to make them appropriate for the new situation of Japan, which had
just become an independent country by the Peace Treaty.3 4  Most jurists who
joined in this symposium rejected such a positivistic view as lex dura sed lex, and
some of them asserted radically that individuals have the natural right to resist
lex dura. It should not be overlooked that many of these were not natural law
adherents but were rather hostile to it, being positivists in their daily academic
work. But when they opposed man-made law, they nevertheless appealed un-
consciously to natural law ideas.
In one article in 1953 Kazuo Amano analyzed the law-reform movement of
the Government from the viewpoint of Marxism; he concluded that law would
necessarily become hard when legislators made it contrary to the interest of the
workers, and the workers had the ius resistendi against such laws.35 Another
article, on "lex dura and Kampf urns Recht," by Wada,36 differs somewhat in its
conclusion from Amano's. As a criterion to judge if a law be dura or not, Wada
depends upon justice itself. Still, as a positivist, he assumes that justice must be
necessarily realized and defined through the Kampf urns Recht in the real world.
But what he means by saying work "through Kamp/ urns Recht" is quite different
from the Klassenkampf of Marxism as well as from what Jhering meant, for
Wada clearly sets justice as the goal of the struggle.
32. NODA, Ho NI OKERU REXISHI To RINEN (1951).
33. There is no general report of the 1953 Session of the Japan Legal Philosophy
Association since the Association did not begin to publish its Annual Report until 1954.
Several individual commentaries were published, however; see note 35.
34. At that time the Government made preparation for setting up a committee to examine
the Constitution. An important issue was whether Article 9, which describes "renounce-
ment of war," should be amended when Japan re-arms for self-defense For details, see
Isao Sato, Kempo Kaisei Mondai no Hatten [The 'Process of Controversies on Amending
the Constitution], 26 HoRITsu JiHo 68 (1954).
35. Amano, Akuho Ron [On Lex Dura], 4 RiTSuMEiKAN HO-OGAU I [Law Review
of Ritsumeikan Univ., Kyoto] (1953).
36. Wada, Akuho Rongi to Ho wo meguru Toso [Controversies on Lex Dura and the
Struggle for the Right], 16 KtXAN HORITSu-GAKU 1 [The Quarterly Law Review] (1953).
See also N. Kobayashi, Akuho Ron, 71 HOOAKU KYOKAI ZAssrn 32 [Law Review of
Tokyo Univ.] (1953).
NATURAL LAW FORUM
Characteristic of postwar Japan has been a serious concern with the problem
of peace, and the jurists also have elaborately studied war and peace. The legal
-aspects of war and peace were at first brought to juristic attention by the inter-
national tribunal of war crimes in which the administration of international
"justice" and the application of natural law were carried out by both the judges
and the prosecutors. Thus, Sheldon Glueck's book, The Nuremberg Trial and
Aggressive War, was widely read soon after the Japanese translation was issued. 3 7
There were, of course, some jurists who opposed the legal basis of the inter-
national tribunal by appealing to the established legal principle of nulla poena
sine lege.38. But those jurists who thought that the war tribunal was legally
justified controverted the former on the ground that natural law should be
effectively applied to international relations in cases where the law is otherwise
lacking.3 9 No deeper attempt to give the legal-p)hilosophical basis of the war
tribunal -has been carried out by the jurists than by Kotaro Tanaka. He has also
written many articles or essays about the problems following the war, and a col-
lection of them was published in the fourth volume of Essays on Legal Philosophy
(1954) with the subtitle Legal Philosophy of Peace. In one of the articles, entitled
"Some Legal Philosophical Considerations About Peace," which seems to me
most important, he starts from a consideration of law in general as a function of
peace-order and maintains that in this respect no essential discrimination should
be made between national and international law; he concludes that peace will be
secured through positive law only when it stands upon natural law and there-
from receives moral power.
Kelsen's work concerning peace, Peace through Law, was translated by Pro-
fessor Nobughige Ukai in 1952 and read by many at that time; it deals with the
problem of bellum justum without recognizing natural law. Another valuable
work in this field, War and Justice, by Dr. Herzog, S.J., Professor of Legal Phi-
losophy at Sophia University in Tokyo, treats mainly of the traditional theory of
bellum justum, and uses that theory as the legal-philosophical basis for defining
war crime and creating the war crime tribunal.4 0
As to other particular themes of natural law, two articles about education by
Tanaka, "Thoughts on Educational Right from the Viewpoint of Natural Law"
and "Fundamental Problems of Legal Education," have thrown a first glimmer
of light on that theme.4 1 In the first article 'he seeks to make clear why the
right of education should be recognized as a natural right pertaining to the
parent by holding that marriage and family life are natural functions of man.
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The other article deals with the relative advantage of legal education over other
kinds of education, both in case method and in lecture method, and with the
need for legal philosophy in each instance to complete special techniques of legal
learning.
To collect natural law studies of the past and to prepare new study on natural
law, an organization was founded by the author and ten colleagues, with the aid
of government funds given to the organization in 1958-1959. This organization
plans to publish a Natural Law Encyclopaedia and to issue an Annual Report of
Natural Law Study. Among the members of the organization there are many
non- and anti-natural law jurists, but the result of their cooperative study holds
great promise as they all have the serious intention of discussing the contemporary
problems of natural law.4 2
In conclusion, I must note that the general tendency among the jurists in
Japan is to treat natural law as one of the theories in the history of legal thought,
or as a mere ideal of legislator or of judge. Even those who affirm an important
role for natural law as such will not deal with it within their jurisprudence. For,
they say, the meaning of natural law is so equivocal that it cannot be used as an
effective term for juridical construction, which should be an exact science. Other
jurists exclude natural law because they say no real law so universal as natural
law can be recognized by our experience. In these views, one of which is held
strongly by the logical-positivists and the other by the sociological jurists, natural
law is exposed to misleading attacks from both sides.
Considering these objections to the natural law, it seems to me an urgent
task for the natural law jurist to develop his concepts of natural law in such'a
way as to make his ideas intelligible to its critics. For this task, I think, Messner's
Naturrecht (translated by Professor Mizunani and others in 1958) is valuable
because the writer explains natural law as the system of existential needs of human
nature. But it is fundamentally necessary for the natural law jurist to develop
some philosophical criticism by which the metaphysical ground of 'his critics'
epistemology may be shown as not omnipotent and, at the same time, that of
natural law may be proved true. I have attempted this task recently in my
book Contemporary Legal Philosophy: Prologue to the Metaphysics of Law
(1960).
The serious situation which the jurists of Japan face demands a legal phi-
losophy. Yet even in the theories of so-called positivists, whether democrats or
Marxists, man finds, more or less, an appeal to an idea of law which is nothing
but natural law. The future of legal philosophy in Japan will give much more
opportunity to the natural law jurist, for the discussion of legal philosophers in
the future, it seems to me, will take place about the idea of law itself.
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